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PARTIES AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
The persons or associations whose interests may be 
substantially affected by this petition include the Plaintiff, 
Cindy Deats, the Defendant, Commercial Security Bank, and other 
similarly situated plaintiffs possessing causes of action in 
negligence and more particularly in the area of slip-and-fall 
injuries to business invitees. 
The issue presented in this petition is whether the trial 
court's instruction, and the Court of Appeals1 subsequent 
affirmation of the instruction that a plaintiff is required to 
avoid a hazard, or is negligent, constituted a prejudicial error 
which mislead the jury and thereby resulted in a verdict contrary 
to the evidence, 
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in this case in 
its opinion: Deats v. Commercial Security Bank, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 
58 (Ct. App., Dec. 15, 1987). 
JURISDICTION 
On December 15, 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
jury's verdict and held that the trial court properly denied 
plaintiff's motion for new trial. 
The Supreme Court of Utah is vested with jurisdiction over 
this petition pursuant to Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-4, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), and Rules 19 and 42 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Sections 78-27-37, 38 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) 
enacted 1973; amended 1986. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff/Petitioner initiated this action against 
Commercial Security Bank to recover for injuries received as the 
result of a slip-and-fall at a parking terrace owned and operated 
by Commercial Security Bank in February of 1984. The jury 
returned a verdict of no cause of action, finding that the bank 
was not negligent. The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion 
for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that the evidence 
was insufficient to justify the verdict, and that the Court 
committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury that the 
Plaintiff was required to avoid the icy condition of the parking 
lot. 
Instruction No. 25 read: 
"Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has a duty of 
seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard which is 
plainly visible, and if the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to so do, then the plaintiff is negligent either 
in failing to look, or in failing to heed what he or 
she saw." 
The Petitioner strenuously objected to the use of the instruction 
on the grounds that it misstated the Plaintiff's required duty of 
-2-
care, and confused the jury, since it implies that if the 
Plaintiff was negligent, she could not recover. 
JUSTIFICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
A writ of certiorari should issue in this matter since the 
decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with several 
principles of law pronounced by the Supreme Court in the cases of 
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah, 1981); 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 
P. 2d 306 (Utah, 1980); and Stephens v. Henderson, 63 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10 (Utah, August 13, 1987). All three cases seem to 
indicate that a jury should be focused on whether a reasonably 
prudent person in the exercise of due care would have incurred 
the risk, despite a knowledge of it, and if so, whether the 
Plaintiff's unreasonableness or negligence would be viewed as 
less than the Defendant's. See Jacobsen at 312; Moore at 870; 
and Stephens at 63 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11 and 12. Based on this 
Court's holdings in Jacobsen, Moore, and Stephens,, the assumption 
of risk language of Instruction No. 25 is not appropriate under 
our comparative negligence statutes since such language implies 
that if the plaintiff was at all negligent, she cannot recover. 
The language of Instruction No. 25 is derived from two Utah 
Supreme Court cases that were decided under contributory 
negligence standards which were a complete bar to a plaintiff's 
recovery. See Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 
P.2d 918 (1964); Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 
(1959). Given the statutory change to comparative negligence and 
-3-
given the fact that this court has ruled that assumption of risk 
language is not appropriate under our comparative negligence 
statutes, the Court of Appeals' ruling that Instruction No. 25 is 
a proper statement of the law clearly creates a conflict in the 
decisions of the Supreme Court and creates confusion in an 
important area of law defining a plaintiff's duty of care in 
negligence actions. 
For these reasons, petitioner respectfully requests that a 
Writ of Certiorari issue for further review by the Supreme Court. 
SUBMITTED THIS / 3 day of January 
&* : ROBERT A. ECimRD 
ATTORNEY FOR/ THE PETITIONER/ 
PLAIMTFF vj 
- 4 -
APPENDIX 
- 5 -
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pleading only by leave of court or 
by ^written consent of the -adverse I 
party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. 
In considering a motion to amend, the trial 
judge must decide 'whether the opposing side 
would^ be put to 'unavoidable prejudice by 
having" an issue adjudicated for which he had 
not time to prepare/ Beklns Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 4551 464 (Utah'1983). Absent 
a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will not 
disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
amend. Guard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 
(Utah 1983). , 
^ Mrs. Kelly -'argues the amendment would 
result in so prejudice to Babcock and Brown 
because they were aware of her action for J 
more than two yean and participated in disc-
overy by attending her deposition. Although 
they attended plaintiff s deposition, Babcock 
and Brown did not participate by asking their 
own questions. Mere awareness of an action 
against other parties does not require a defe-
ndant to prepare a defense m anticipation of 
plaintiff s decision at some future tune to jom 
defendant as a party. See Randall v. Saivanon 
Army, 100 Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241 (1984) 
(consolidation does not necessarily render lit-
igant! pamestaeach other's suits). . 
^JTbercase had been pending for over three 
years * when, just prior to trial, Mrs. Kelly 
moved to amend her complaint. A hearing on 
the motion was held one week before trial was 
set to begnu Babcock and Brown were prep-
ared N to defend against five personal injury 
claims* That does not mean they could be J 
required to defend, on short notice, a wron-
gful death action of a different plaintiff. If the 
toal court had gramed the motion so close to J 
, trial* it may have required a continuance of 
the trial which, in turn, could have prejudiced 
the consolidated casesfc - 7 , ^ ^ ^ ^ ,. - \ 
"X^We^conciude tic trial court acted within its | 
- discretion injienymg Mrs J" Kelly's motion to I 
amend. The "court's order h affirmed. jCosts 
c toBabcock and Brown.
 r< J^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r ** ^ " I 
^sdRusseil WcBench* J u d g e s * „r -v*^ i^ 
* WE "CONCUR: ******&* ^ *U-~ v*m*i~tar 
^ ^ a m e l a Tf Greenw6odr ludgr " - S s s a " * s£ 
For compete Utah Code AOHOUCIOIIS, 
Citeas 
72 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Cindy DEATS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
y. 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and 
Bench. 
No. 860322-CA 
FILED: December 15,1987 
SECOND DISTRICT 
Honorable David E. Roth 
ATTORNEYS: 
Robert A. Echard for Appellant. 
Donald J. Purser, J. Angus Edwards for 
Respondent. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiff Cindy Deats ('Deats*) appeals 
from a jury verdict that Commercial Security 
Bank (*CSB*) was not negligent in the main-
tenance of its parking terrace. Deats claims 
that the jury's verdict was contrary to the 
evidence and manifestly unjust,, and that a 
jury instruction misstated the law, constituting 
prejudicial error. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTS 
At 7:05 a.m. on Monday, February 27, 
1984, Deats parked on the uncovered fourth 
level of a parking structure owned by CSB. 
Arriving before sunnse, Deats was the first 
patron of the parking lot. After parking her 
car, Deats, while walkingA towards the exit 
stairway, decided to move her car because she 
thougnt another car might slide mto it. While 
returning to move her car to a safer location,* 
Dears sfovped and feU on the ice, hurpng her 
left knee. After she had moved her car, Deats' 
observed a person throwing sand or salt on the 
previously unsanded parking surface-"* Deats 
fUed a negligence action against' CSB to* 
recover for the personal injuries she sustained 
from the fall. 
- ^The case was submitted to the jury after the 
tnai judge read thirty-nine Instrucuons^ihc-
hiding instructions on comparative negligence* 
the duty of care required of business mviton, 
and the duty ot care required of a plainaff in 
a negligence action. 
' The jury found that CSB was not negligent. 
Deats subsequently filed a motion for a new 
tnal pursuant to Ru,e 59 of the Utah Rules of 
onsuit Code •Co* s Annotation Service 
App. i 
Code* Co 
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Civil Procedure, alleging: (1) the jury's verdict 
was contrary to the evidence and manifestly 
unjust, and (2) instruction twenty-five was a 
misstatement of the law, constituting prejud-
icial error. 
The trial court denied Deats* motion for a 
new trial and this appeal ensued. 
n. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT 
A jury's verdict which is the subject of a 
motion for a new trial will be reversed only if 
the evidence supporting it was completely 
lacking or so slight and unconvincing as to 
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust. Roylance v. Rowe, 111 P.2d 232, 234 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). We review the jury's 
verdict in the light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party, and accord the evidence prese-
nted and every reasonable inference fairly 
drawn from the evidence the same degree of 
deference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 
172 (Utah 1983); see Jacobsen Construction 
Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 
P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1980). 
* In determining whether a business invitor 
was negligent, the inquiry is whether the 
owner or its employees knew, or in the exer-
cise of ordinary care should have known, that 
a dangerous condition existed, and whether 
sufficient time elapsed such that corrective 
action could have been taken to remedy the 
situation. Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 
P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977). Property 
owners are not insurers for the safety of their 
business invitees. Id. 
Applying this legal principle, the evidence, 
viewed in a light favorable to the jury's 
verdict, adequately supports the verdict that 
CSB was not negligent in the operation and 
maintenance of its parking terrace. Testimony 
revealed that CSB was servicing the fourth 
level of the parking terrace at approximately 
the time of Deats' early arrival. The jury 
could have reasonably concluded that suffic-
ient time had not elapsed since the ice formed 
such that CSB could have remedied the situ-
ation. 
In finding that CSB was not at all negligent, 
the jury necessarily found that Deats was 100 
percent negligent. The evidence, again viewed 
in a light favorable to the jury's verdict, 
supports the jury's determination that Deats 
was 100 percent negligent. First, Deats admi-
tted she knew the uncovered fourth Itvel of 
the parking terrace was icy. Second, Deats 
conceded she did not have to park on the 
fourth level. Indeed, on a prior occasion, 
Deats parked on an adjacent street when she 
knew the fourth level parking surface would 
be icy. Third, Deats arrived before sunrise. 
Given the totality of the circumstances, we 
find the jury's verdict reasonable and just. 
Deats attempts to impeach the jury's verdict 
by affidavits of two jurors, claiming they 
misunderstood the trial court's instructions. It 
is well-established, however, that Rule 
59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows an affidavit by a juror to impeach the 
verdict only when the verdict was determined 
by chance or bribery.' Rosenlaf v." Sullivan, 
676 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1983). Her attempt to 
impeach the verdict by way of affidavit is 
plainly contrary to law. The jurors' misund-
erstanding of the court's instruction is not one 
of the narrowly defined grounds available 
under Rule 59(a)(2). 
m. 
INSTRUCTION TWENTY-FIVE 
Deats' second issue on appeal is that instr-
uction twenty-five misstated the law regar-
ding a plaintiffs duty of care, thereby causing 
the jury to erroneously find that CSB was not 
negligent. Deats contends instruction twenty-
five constitutes an "assumption of risk* inst-
ruction, which is not permissible under Utah's 
comparative negligence statutes. Utah Code 
I Ann. §§78-27-37, , -38 (1987). We disa-
gree. 
Instruction twenty-five reads: 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any 
action has the duty of seeing and 
avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard 
which is plainly visible, and if the 
plaintiff [unreasonably] failed to do 
so, then the plaintiff is negligent 
either in failing to look or in failing 
to heed what he or she saw. 
Deats urges us to interpret this instruction 
as meaning that Deats is barred from recovery 
/ / she failed to avoid the icy conditions of the 
parking surface, regardless of "whether she 
exercised reasonable care and regardless of 
whether CSB exercised reasonable care. If this 
interpretation is correct, then Deats contends 
the jury would net apportion the negligence 
between the paries. We reject Deats' constr-
uction of this instruction. 
Instructions are read in their entire context 
and given meaning in accordance with the 
ordinary and usuai import of the ianroage as 
it would be understood by lay jurors. Brunson 
v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 367, 412 F.2d 451, 
452-53 (1966), Under Utah9! comr-arative 
negligence statute, Utah Code Ann. 373-27-
38 (1987), • and its a<xompanying definition 
counterpart, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 
(1S37), the concept of contributory nsgiigence 
includes what was formerly termed secondary 
assumption of risk: "the unreasonable encou-
ntering of a known and appreciated risk/ 
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 
631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981); see Jacobsen 
Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 310, 312. More 
specifically, 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code«Co's Annotation Service 
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tne reasona&ieness of plaintiffs J 
bonduct in confronting a known or -
unknown risk created by defen-
dant's negligence will basically be 
determined under principles of 
contributory negligence. Attention 
should be focused on whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the 
exercise of due care would have 
Incurred the risk,"despite his kno- l 
wledge of it, and if so, whether he 
would have conducted himself in 
the manner in which, the plaintiff 
acted in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, including the appr-
eciated risk. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 312. 
It is well-settled that a plaintiff, acting in a 
reasonanbly prudent manner, has a duty to 
foresee a danger, Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co., 631 P.2d at 870, particularly 
one that is plainly visible, and avoid it. Hin-
dmarsh v, O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 
413, 416-17, 446 P.2d 410, 412 (1968). If a 
plaintiff fails to see or sees but falls to avoid 
the danger, then the plaintiff acted negligently. 
See Pollesche v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, 
Inc.r$20 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1974) (plaintiff 
who sees and ignores the danger is guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law); 
Hindmarsh, 21 Utah 2d 413 at 417, 446 P.2d 
at 412; Whitman v. W, T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 
2d Sh 83, 395 P.2d 918, 920 (1964) (plaintiff 
can be negligent either in failing to look or in 
failing to heed what he or she saw). 
Instruction twenty-five, when read together 
with all of the other instructions given on 
negligence, is a correct statement of a plain-
tiffs duty in a negligence action. Nowhere in 
instruction twenty-five, nor in any of the 
other remaining thirty-eight instructions, did 
the trial court intimate that if Deats was neg-
ligent then she was precluded from recovering. 
On the contrary, the instructions, when read 
in their entirety, adequately informed the jury 
of CSB's duty of care as a property owner, 
•Deats' duty of care, and most importantly, of 
the procedure by which the jury must appor-
:tion negligence if both parties were found to 
have acted negligently. [ 
The -trial court properly denied Deats' [ 
.motion for a new trial. The evidence supper- 1 
ting the Jury's findings was ample and conv- I 
lincing, and the verdict, therefore, was not 
unreasonable nor unjust. Roylance,. 737 P.2d 
at 234; Nelson v. Ttufflo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1982). 
Affirmed.^Costs to Commerical Security 
Bank.) 
Judith M. Billings, Judge I 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code*Co's Annotation Service 
78-27-36 JUDICIAL CODE 
indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured 
person not to be bound by the settlement agreement, liability release, or 
disavowed statement. 
History: L. 1973, en. 208, § 4. 
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or 
statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.—The rights 
provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in lieu of, 
any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise existing 
in the law. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5. 
78-27-37. Comparative negligence—Diminishment of damages—"Con-
tributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."—Contributory neg-
ligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal repre-
sentative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in 
death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great 
as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery 
is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion 
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. As used 
in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the risk." 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 1. releases on other joint tort-feasors.—L. 
m i - . ^ 1973, ch. 209. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to actions for the re- Cross-Beference. 
covery of damages in actions based on Product Liabili ty Act, manufacturer or 
negligence or gross negligence; removing seller not liable if alteration or modifica-
contributory negligence as a bar to any tion of product after sale is substantial 
recovery under certain circumstances; pro- contributing cause of injury, 78-15-5. 
viding for the diminishing of any recovery 
in proportion to the negligence of the ^aw Reviews. 
person seeking recovery; providing for Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & 
separate judgments as to damages and Light Co.—Jury Blindfolding in Compara-
proportionate negligence; providing for tive Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 
contribution among joint tort-feasors; pro- 569. 
viding for the release of one or more Note, A Primer on Damages under the 
joint tort-feasors without releasing them Utah Wrongful Death and Survival Stat-
all; and providing for the effect of such utes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519. 
78-27-38. Separate special verdicts on damages and percentage of negli-
gence—Reduction of damages.—The court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining 
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and (2) the percentage of negli-
gence attributable to each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount 
of the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person seeking recovery. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 209, § 2. 
78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors—Discharge of common 
liability by joint tort-feasor required.—(1) The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled 
348 
App. i i 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-37 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Release *» 25 et seq. 
78-27-35, Release, settlement, or statement by injured per-
son — Notice of rescission or disavowal. 
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is 
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage 
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take a 
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expres-
sion the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement 
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d § 14 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq. 
78-27-36, Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set-
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi-
tion to other provisions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in 
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise 
existing in the law. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-36. 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § 1. diminishment of damages and assumption of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, risk, and reenacts the above section, 
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-
425 
Appp.iii 
78-27-38 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to 
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec-
tion. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration 
or modification of product after sale is substan-
tial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator for injury resulting from 
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assumption of risk. 
Bailment. 
Causation. 
Jury instructions. 
Last clear chance. 
Unit method of determining negligence. 
Cited. 
Assumption of risk. 
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known 
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a 
lack of due care constituting negligence; where 
such is the case and the party assuming the 
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by 
comparative negligence statute, he is charge-
able with contributory negligence and is liable 
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accor-
dance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 
1977). 
Assumption of risk language is not appropri-
ate to describe the various concepts previously 
dealt with under that terminology but is to be 
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory 
negligence; when the issue is raised attention 
should be focused on whether a reasonably pru-
dent man in the exercise of due care would 
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge 
of it, and if so, whether he would have con-
ducted himself in the manner in which the per-
son seeking to recover acted in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, including the ap-
preciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of 
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be 
less than that of the person from whom recov-
ery is sought, any damages allowed should be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to the person recovering. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, 
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980). 
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk" 
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a 
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981). 
B a i l m e n t 
The comparative negligence statutes do not 
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee 
in handling the bailed property is not imputed 
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410 
(Utah 1981). 
Causation. 
Trial court committed prejudicial error in 
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs com-
parative negligence where his act of alleged 
negligence did not in any way contribute to his 
injury, although it may have increased sever-
ity of damages; comparative negligence be-
comes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs 
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in 
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984). 
Jury instructions. 
If requested, a trial court must inform the 
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning 
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it 
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the 
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
426 
App. iv 
10 63 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code«Co Ptovo, Utah 
compensation jaw. in Bryan, this Court held that 
one who intentionally injures a fellow employee may 
be separately liable to the injured worker. In such a 
case, the employer would be liable only for the 
benefits provided unaer the Workers' Compensation 
Act and could not be required to respond as the 
offending employee's superior. In Shell Oil, we held 
that a contract whereby a joint venturer agreed to 
indemnify his partner against liabilities incurred on 
the joint venture jobsite was enforceable, though the 
contract resulted in an employer's agreement to 
accept liability in excess of the compensation due 
under the Act, where the partner's negligence resu-
lted in injury to the joint venturer's own employee. 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Joan F. STEPHENS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Brent HENDERSON, dba Classic Skating 
Center, and John Doe, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 860440 
FHED: August 13,1987 
FOURTH DISTRICT "7~" 
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
ATTORNEYS: 
Carman E. Kipp, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Ray Harding Ivie, Ray Phillips Ivie, and 
James G. Clark* Provo, for Respondent 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment on a jury 
verdict in a negligence action. Defendant Srent 
Henderson dba Classic Skating Center asserts 
that the trial judge committed reversible error 
in refusing to give certain jury instructions 
requested by him and in refusing to apply the 
provisions of the Liability Reform Act. Utah 
: Code 'Mnn .^§§ 78-27-37 to ?-43 as 
amended in 19S6. 
On November 8, 1984, plaintiff Joan Step-
hens injured her wrist when she fell after being 
tripped by an unknown skater while she was 
roller. :skatmg at Classic Skating Center in 
X)rem;^ JJtah/ Stephens>^illed '• suiter naming 
Henderson'and * John! Doe*^ as * defendants. 
Trial wa* held on July' 29, 1986, At the close 
of
 : plaintiff'sfcase^7; Henderson^ counsel 
moved to apply the ^ Liability Reform Act, 
which became^ effective April 28* 1986UAppl-
ication of: the Act would have Held each def-
endant! liable: for damages only in proportion 
to - his own individual fault.^The trial court 
denied the motion. The court also refused to 
give certain instructions requested by Hende-
rson. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff 
in the amount of $17,357.92/ finding John 
Doe 75 percent negligent, Henderson/Classic 
Skating Center 25 percent negligent, and pla-
intiff free from any negligence. On August 15r 
1986, plaintiff executed against Henderson for 
the entire amount of the judgment. 
In 1986, the legislature repealed the Comp-
arative Negligence Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
.78-27-37 to -43, and replaced it with the 
Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-27-37 tor -43, as reenacted. The Liabi-
lity Reform Act did not expressly direct that 
any of its provisions should operate retroact-
ively. Section 78-27-40 of that Act provides 
in part: *[T]he maximum amount for which a 
defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of 
the damages equivalent to the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributed to that defen-
dant." In contrast, the Comparative Neglig-
ence Act provided for joint and several liabi-
lity, that is, each defendant was liable to the 
plaintiff for the full amount of the plaintiffs 
damages. 
Henderson contends that, the Liability 
Reform Act, eliminating joint and. several 
liability, should have been applied in this case. 
On the other hand, Stephens asserts that doing 
so would have effected an impermissible retr-
oactive result. 
The starting point for our analysis is Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-3, which provides: "No 
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." The application 
of a statute is retroactive if it alters the subs-
tantive law on which the parties relied. See 
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, 
Inc., 731 P .2d 475 (Utah.1986); see also Petty 
v. Clark, 113 Utah 205,192 P.2d 589 (1948); cf. 
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 
2d 321, 392 P.2d 622 (1964). Law is substan-
tive if it "creates, defines and regulates the 
rights and duties of the parties and ... may 
give rise to a cause for action, as distinguished 
from adjective law which pertains to and 
prescribes the practice and procedure or the 
legal machinery by which the substantive, law 
is determined or made effective." Perry w 
Clark, 192 P.2d at 593-94. Other: jurisdict-
ions have held similar statutes to be substan-
tive. Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. ,App. 
3d 810, 230. CaL Rptr^lOZ (CaL.App. 1st 
[ Dist. 1986) :(hoiding Proposition Sl^wnich 
eliminated joint and several liability for non-
economic damages, to have prospective-effect 
only); see also United States.Fidelity & .Gusi-
anty Co.'.v. Park City Corp,,,397..F^'SETO-
411^ 414-15 (D^ Or^ 1973)/ CPIhe* j^iadon-
ship'between the pardes'is.J^eH^of the date 
of. the faccidenV It is 'M that . t f i^ that-these 
parties became joint tortfeasors.^Their .rights 
and obligations as among themselves are 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code#Co's Annotation Service 
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-governed by the then existing substantive law 
u::/)y kfrd, 526 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1975). ; 
In the instant case, the Comparative Negli-
gence Act was the substantive law defining, in 
jpart, the relationship between the parties at 
the time of the accident. Section 78-27-41 
provided, "Nothing in this act shall affect: (1) 
the common-law liability of the several joint 
tort-feasors to have judgment recovered, and 
payment mader from them individually by. the 
injured person for the whole injury." The 
Liability Reform Act redefines the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the joint tort-
feasors. Since the Act changes the substantive 
law in effect when plaintiffs cause of action 
"arose,-its application would have retroactive 
effect. That being the case, section 68-3-3 
dictates that it may not be applied unless 
expressly so directed by the legislature. The 
'Liability Reform Act contains no such express 
direction. 
We note Henderson's argument for an alt-
ernate method to determine if a legislative act 
, is retroactive. He asserts that there is no retr- J 
bactive effect if a new statute takes effect 
before judgment is entered in the case. 
However, we have long held that a party may 
not be deprived of a right simply because 
judgment has not yet been entered. To* para-
phrase our holding in Buttrey v. Guaranteed 
Securities Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040 
(1931), a case involving the repeal of a statute 
holding corporate directors individually liable 
to stockholders, cases which hold that a stat-
utorily created right can be destroyed at any 
time until final judgment because the right has 
not yet vested, are in error. Id. at 1045. To 
: allow the substantive law in a case to be 
changed at any time up until entry of final 
judgment would allow a plaintiff to be effec-
tively deprived of a cause of actioni Campbell 
v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979), cited by 
Henderson as authority, is inapposite. In that 
case, we were presented with the question 
rwhether it was permissible to include interest 
"on a judgment for a plaintiffs damages from 
the time of the injury, even though the statute 
1 aliowing^ such interest became effective after 
'..'the accident giving rise, to the injuries. In 
holding that result permissible, we noted that 
Jhe legislature, 'expUddy directed all [future] 
judgments to add interest computet! from the I 
time of the act giving rise to the accident.*Id. I 
:at^l042.^There is noanalogous^statutory Ian-r 
guagem the liability Reform A c t 5 ^ - l ^ ^ i f c f 
^ Our determinarioa that. application of the | 
liability Reform Act would be impermissibly 
retroactive^in,this^c^is.Teinforced by,our 
^decision in Brunycrv* Salt Lake County, ;551 
jPJd 521 (Utah 1976).' In/that case,! we were 
• ^ confronted;. withJ whether^, thc[ t Comparative ; 
Negligence Act should apply to allow contri- | 
bution between tort-feasors who had negli- j 
gently injured the plaintiff before the effective j 
date of the act. We held that since the right to 
iNCE REPORTS l l 
contribution arose by statute after the acci-
dent, the statute creating the right could not 
apply. Our holding in that case was reiterated 
in Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 
689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984), where we stated 
that Brunyer stands for the proposition that 
"the act was not applicable in any Tespect to 
any liability for injuries occurring prior to the 
effect [sic] date of the statute/ Id. at 1347 
n,3. A statute eliminating joint and several 
liability may not be applied to injuries occur-
ring prior to its effective date. The injuries in 
this case occurred on November 8, 1984; the 
Liability Reform Act was not effective until 
April 28, 1986. Therefore, the trial court was 
correct in holding that the Liability Reform 
Act did not apply; 
: Henderson next contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to give his requested jury ins-
truction No. 21: 
There is a legal principle, com-
monly referred to by the term 
'assumption of risk", which is as 
follows: 
•One is said to assume a risk when 
he voluntarily manifests his assent 
to a dangerous condition or to the 
creation or maintenance of a dan-
gerous condition and voluntarily 
exposes himself to that danger, or 
when he knows, or in the exercise 
of ordinary care would know, that 
a danger exists in the condition of 
the property and voluntarily places 
himself or remains within the posi-
tion of danger. 
If you find that Joan Stephens 
assumed the risks -which .were 
known by her or which should have 
been known by her concerning the 
dangers associated with roller 
skating, she would be: „• guilty - of 
negligence-
We held in Jacobsen Construction Co. v. 
Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 
1980), that assumption-of-risk language is 
not appropriate under our comparative negli-
gence statutes. As was illustrated by that case, 
assumption of the risk in its secondary sense, 
as used in the requested instruction, is to be 
treated as contributory negligence. Id; at 312. 
The jury was given instructions on contribu-
torjr negligence; therefore, the trial court was 
correct in refusing defendant's^requested ins-
FiructionNol21: 
'^Henderson lastly contends Jthat the trial 
court erred in refusing to give his requested 
instruction No. ll, which read: 
Should you :rdetermine^that the 
plaintiff %as ; deliberately ^knocked 
down,* you Jare instructed* that a 
roller skating proprietor has a duty 
to guard roller.skaters,jagainst ass-
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code* Co's Annotation Service 
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aults by fellow roller skaters if the 
circumstances are such that an 
ordinarily prudent person might 
reasonably anticipate the danger of 
such assaults and knew or should 
have1 known of the tendency of a 
fellow skater to assault other 
patrons of the establishment. 
Henderson points out that plaintiffs fnena 
who accompanied her to the roller rink testi-
fied that the unknown skater, after knocking 
plaintiff down, yelled, *l scored another/ She 
further testified that she had seen him knock 
down another skater moments before he made 
contact with plaintiff. Henderson argues that 
this testimony indicates that plaintiff was int-
entionally assaulted and that consequently 
requested instruction No. 27 was necessary to 
instruct the jury as to the duty Henderson 
owed plaintiff to protect her against intenti-
onal torts by other patrons. 
We find no prejudicial error in the refusal 
to give this instruction. It is true, as asserted 
by Henderson, that a proprietor, to be held 
liable, must have some cause to believe that 
one patron may assault another patron. Gus-
tzveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982). 
Nevertheless, under the facts here such an 
instruction was not required since the instru-
ctions given covered this subject, Henderson 
had two floor guards assigned to monitor the 
skating and to warn or remove those skaters 
who indulged in unsafe practices, such as 
racing, pushing, or rowdy behavior. The ins-
tructions given by the court informed the jury 
that it was the theory of plaintiffs case that 
Henderson was negligent because his floor 
guards failed to properly supervise the skating 
of other patrons of the rink. The jury was 
further instructed that the proprietor of a 
public amusement has the duty to use ordinary 
care and diligence to protect patrons, but this 
duty does not extend to becoming an insurer 
of their safety. Negligence was defined. Under 
the facts of this case, Henderson's duty to 
protect plaintiff from those who would inte-
ntionally trip her was not different than the 
duty to protect heir from those who would 
negligently or recklessly run into her. The 
floor guards were there to monitor all skaters. 
Requested instruction No. 27 was properly 
refused as surplusage since other instructions 
adequately covered the duty owed to plaintiff 
to protect her from the .errant conduct of 
Other skaters* irrespective of how that conduct 
inight be characterized. This case, is jmlike 
Custevcson y. Gregg, $upra,~ where the desk 
clerk in a bowling alley who had no respons-
ibility to monitor the conduct of patrons had 
no reason to believe that an argument might 
erupt between two patrons and that one might 
punch the other in the face. In that case, we 
held the proprietor not liable as a matter of 
law. In the instant case, the peril was forese-
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
eable, even anticipated, and floor guards were 
assigned to watch for and immediately stop 
the very conduct which injured plaintiff. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Gregory K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge 
Stewart, Associate Chief Justice, does 
not participate herein; Orme, Court of 
Appeals Judge, sat. 
Gte as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RDG ASSOCIATES/JORMAN 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, 
defendant and Appellant, 
v. 
Atkinson, Eddy R., et a!., 
Employees. 
No. 860003 
FILED: August 13, 1987 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
ATTORNEYS: 
John T. Anderson, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent 
Theodore L. Cannon, Jay Stone, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
I This is an appeal from a summary judgment 
I entered by the district court against the Indu-
strial Commission in an action to enforce its 
orders' against RDG Associates/Jorman 
Corporation (RDG) for wages not paid by T & 
I K Steel, Inc. <T & X), to its employees- The 
I issue is whether an owner-developer of land 
who contracts with a builder for the constru-
I ction of an improvement on the owner's land 
I is liable for the unpaid wages of the builder's 
t employees under the Utah -Wage Payment 
I Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-8 (1974). 
1 Sixty-three employees of T & K assigned 
I their rights to unpaid wages to the Industrial 
I Commission for collection pursuant to § 34-
28-13.^ The employees worked for T & K 
[ while it performed a construction contract for 
RDG, an owner-developer of land. 
* ' -
consult Code • Co's Annotation Service 
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fit to testify in his own behalf, and the jury 
was not obligated to believe his testimony. 
Defendant points to the lack of direct 
testimony that the automobile was opera-
tional at the time of its theft. Inasmuch as 
it was uncontradicted that the automobile 
was stolen between 8:00 and 10:30 p. m. and 
was observed being driven into defendant's 
shed at 11:30 p. m. on the same evening, the 
jury was at liberty to infer that it was 
operational at the time of the theft. 
Defendant also contends that the only 
evidence connecting him to the theft was 
his possession of the recently stolen automo-
bile. However, the record contains other 
corroborative evidence, not the least of 
which is the following: 1) defendant's own 
explanation of his possession, 2) his conceal-
ment of the automobile and partial disman-
tlement, 3) his false claim of ownership and 
evidence of title, and 4) his admission to 
Detective Leonard of his knowledge that 
the automobile was stolen.14 
The conviction and judgment are af-
firmed. 
HOWE, J., and CALVIN GOULD, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat. 
CROCKETT, J., heard the arguments, 
but retired before the opinion was written. 
KEY HuMBiR SYSTEM i TEM> 
Paul T. MOORE, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16672. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 22, 1981. 
Defendant appealed from judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David K. Winder, J., based on jury's special 
verdict which found defendant liable for 
personal injuries sustained by plaintiff 
while operating a radial arm saw on de-
fendant's business premises. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) although 
trial court should have instructed that there 
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvi-
ous danger so as to have avoided any possi-
ble misunderstanding, failure to do so was 
harmless; (2) since duty of plaintiff and 
consequences of a breach thereof were ex-
plained to jury in appropriate language, 
there was no error in not giving an instruc-
tion on secondary assumption of risk in 
addition to a contributory negligence in-
struction; and (3) there was substantial evi-
dence in record to support jury's findings, 
and thus trial court did not err in failing to 
instruct jury that, as a matter of law, plain-
tiff was negligent and that the negligence 
was sole cause of the injury, or alternative-
ly that it was a proximate cause of the 
injury. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion in 
which Crockett, J., concurred. 
14. See State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 247 
(1931); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 
P.2d 653 (1952). 
1. Appeal and Error <^ 1063(5) 
Products Liability <s=>96 
In action to recover for injuries sus-
tained when plaintiff was using radial arm 
App- v i 
8 6 6 Utah 631 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
saw on defendant's business premises, trial 
court, in order to avoid any possible misun-
derstanding by jury, should have instructed 
that there was no duty to warn an invitee 
of an obvious danger, but failure to do so 
was harmless, because, in light of specific 
findings of jury that plaintiff was negligent 
but that his negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the injury and that defendant was 
negligent and that its negligence was a 
proximate cause of the injury, there was no 
reasonable likelihood that there would have 
been a result more favorable to defendant 
had the instruction been given as requested. 
2. Trial <s=*358 
A jury's answers to special interrogato-
ries must, if at all possible, be read harmo-
niously. 
3. Negligence <s=*67, 105 
A plaintiff's failure to foresee a danger 
which a reasonable person acting in a pru-
dent manner would have foreseen is "desig-
nated negligent conduct," whereas "as-
sumption of risk" designates conduct of a 
person who unreasonably takes a known 
and appreciated risk. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Negligence <s=»105 
"Assumption of risk," as that term is 
used in statute providing that contributory 
negligence shall not bar recovery in a negli-
gence action, is a voluntary and unreason-
able exposure to a known danger. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-27-37. 
5. Negligence <s=>97 
"Secondary assumption of risk," which 
is the unreasonable encountering of a 
known and appreciated risk and in reality 
an aspect of contributory negligence, is 
treated in same manner as contributory 
negligence for purpose of apportioning 
fault under comparative negligence statute. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
1. Deal's lumber was purchased out of state and 
stored at Intermountain Lumber ("Intermoun-
6. Trial <s=>260(8) 
In action to recover for injuries sus-
tained when plaintiff was using radial arm 
saw on defendant's business premises, there 
was no error in not giving an instruction on 
secondary assumption of risk in addition to 
a contributory negligence instruction since 
duty of plaintiff and consequences of a 
breach thereof were explained to jury in 
appropriate language; overruling Rigtrup 
v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d 
1247, U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
7. Products Liability <s»85, 96 
There was substantial evidence in rec-
ord to support findings of jury that defend-
ant was liable for personal injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff while operating radial 
arm saw on defendant's business premises, 
and thus trial court correctly refused to 
instruct jury that,-as a matter of law, plain-
tiff was negligent and that the negligence 
was sole cause of the injury, or alternative-
ly that it was a proximate cause of the 
injury. 
Raymond M. Berry, Brucett Jensen, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
W. Eugene Hansen, Ralph L. Dewsnup, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from a judgment 
based on a jury's special verdict which 
found defendant liable for personal injuries 
sustained by plaintiff while operating a ra-
dial arm saw on defendant's business prem-
ises. 
During approximately a two-year period, 
from June 1973 to May 1975, plaintiff su-
pervised a large building project for Deal 
Development Company ("Deal") in Salt 
Lake City. Deal had an open account with 
defendant which was used in charging 
hardware items purchased for the project.1 
Shortly before noon on May 1, 1975, 
plaintiff and one Buddy Prince, a fellow 
tain"), several blocks away from defendant's 
business premises. 
MOORE v. 
employee of Deal, drove 
business premises in plaintiffs pickup 
truck. Their purpose was to buy some 
hardware items and to ask permission to 
use defendant's radial arm saw to cut sever-
al two-by-fours into blocks to be used in 
enclosing air-conditioning ducts. While 
Prince gathered the hardware items, plain-
tiff went to the front desk to seek permis-
sion to use the radial arm saw. There is 
substantial conflict in the evidence as to 
what thereafter transpired.2 
Plaintiff apparently spoke with defend-
ant's office manager who quoted plaintiff a 
price per cut for the use of the saw, but no 
set price was agreed upon. Plaintiff testi-
fied that thereafter someone told him to 
check with the yardmen and that if the saw 
was not being used, it would be all right for 
him to use it. 
Plaintiff went out into the yard and told 
a yardman by the name of Jessie that he 
had been given permission to use the saw. 
Jessie led plaintiff to the saw shed, where 
plaintiff offered to give Jessie a six-pack of 
beer if he would change the blade before 
plaintiff got back from Intermountain 
Lumber with the lumber to be cut. Jessie 
allegedly agreed, and plaintiff and Prince 
then drove to Intermountain where they 
picked up the two-by-fours they planned to 
cut into blocks. Plaintiff claims they 
stopped at a small store where they bought 
the beer promised to Jessie. They then 
returned to defendant's business premises 
and entered through the back gate. 
Plaintiff entered the saw shed and no-
ticed that the saw had been reset from the 
ripping position to the cross-cut position. 
He then measured the length he wanted to 
cut and drove a nail into the table for use 
as a gauge so that he would not have to 
measure each cut separately. Plaintiff 
started the saw and cut the first two-by-
four by placing its end against the nail 
gauge, pulling the saw toward him and 
returning it, then knocking the cut block 
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to defendant's out of the way, and moving his two-by-four 
up to the nail gauge to repeat the process. 
This procedure was following approximate-
ly seven to nine times. 
When he finished cutting the first two-
by-four, plaintiff pushed the saw back to its 
return position and went to the end of the 
table to get the second two-by-four. He 
took hold of the second two-by-four with 
both hands and moved it along the table in 
front of a one-by-four which served as a 
guide. Plaintiff momentarily directed his 
attention to the nail gauge on the table to 
make sure the two-by-four abutted it, when 
suddenly the saw cut his hand. Before he 
could pull his hand away from the saw, his 
thumb and his index and middle fingers of 
his right hand were severed, and his re-
maining two fingers were severely cut. 
There is no evidence that the blade of the 
saw cut through the board and then into 
plaintiff's fingers, or that plaintiff either 
manually pulled the saw into a cutting posi-
tion, or that he moved his hand into the 
saw, as is speculated by the dissent. Nor is 
there evidence that the manner in which 
plaintiff placed his hand on the board was 
improper. 
The testimony at trial included evidence 
that the radial arm saw had been in use on 
defendant's premises for over thirty years 
without an accident. There was a sign 
hanging on the wall opposite the saw which 
read in large yellow letters, "For Use of 
Authorized Operator Only." Plaintiff testi-
fied to having had experience operating 
such saws, and, although he admitted that 
such saws are, by their very nature, ex-
tremely dangerous, he claimed he was com-
petent to operate the saw without any in-
struction or assistance. 
The evidence indicated that the saw was 
equipped with a hood guard which serves to 
control direction of the sawdust produced 
by cutting wood; it is not designed to be a 
safety guard but could be rotated down 
against most thicknesses of lumber. Plain-
2. Defendant and its employees dispute plain-
tiffs claim that he received permission to use 
the saw. For the purposes of this appeal, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. 
Meibos, Utah, 607 P.2d 798 (1980); Rodgers v. 
Hansen, Utah, 580 P.2d 233 (1973). 
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tiffs expert testified that the hood guard 
was not an adequate blade guard, that is, a 
guard designed to prevent the operator of 
the saw from coming into contact with the 
saw blade. International standards for 
blade guards require that such guards per-
mit no more than % inch clearance between 
the bottom of the guard and the saw table 
when the blade is exposed. Even if the 
hood guard were rotated down, once the 
lumber was cut the clearance between the 
bottom of the guard and the table would 
exceed % inch. Thus, even had plaintiff 
rotated the hood guard down so that it 
would contact the two-by-four being cut, 
the guard would not have prevented plain-
tiff's hand from being drawn into the blade 
of the saw. 
In addition, plaintiffs expert testified 
that the saw in question was not equipped 
with a system to prevent the spinning blade 
from creeping forward from its rest posi-
tion. A large spinning blade will creep 
forward unless it is restrained, either me-
chanically or by gravity. In a mechanical 
restraint system a spring or a pulley and 
weight system holds the blade in the maxi-
mum rearward position. The same result 
can be obtained by simply tilting the front 
of the table slightly so that gravity keeps 
the blade in the proper rest position. In the 
opinion of plaintiff's expert, the lack of 
proper blade guards and a blade restraining 
system rendered the saw in question "defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous." 
A special verdict was returned finding 
both plaintiff and defendant negligent, but, 
significantly, the jury also found plaintiffs 
negligence not to have been a cause of the 
injury. The jury also found that plaintiff 
was a business invitee and not a licensee or 
trespasser and assessed damages in the 
amount of $144,892. The court entered 
judgment in that amount against defend-
an t Defendant's motion for a new trial 
was denied, and this appeal followed. 
[1] Defendant's first claim on appeal is 
that the trial court prejudicially erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury that there is no 
duty to warn a business invitee of an obvi-
ous danger. Specifically, defendant argues 
that because one instruction informed the 
jury that there was no duty to warn licen-
sees of obvious dangers, the failure to give 
such an instruction with respect to invitees 
may have led the jury to believe erroneous-
ly that defendant should have warned 
plaintiff as to obvious dangers. Defendant 
also claims that the trial court erred in 
failing to instruct on the defense of as-
sumption of risk and in refusing to submit 
that defense to the jury for a finding in the 
special verdict. 
There are of course certain risks which 
anyone of adult age must be taken to ap-
preciate. Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 
270, 258 P.2d 453 (1953); Prosser, Handbook 
of the Law of Torts (4th ed.) § 61 p. 394, see 
also § 68 p. 448. It has long been held that 
a property owner has no obligation to warn 
an invitee of dangers which are known to 
the invitee or which are so obvious and 
apparent that he may reasonably be expect-
ed to discover them. Defendant specifically 
contends that the evidence supported its 
theory that the dangers were obvious and 
that the defendant therefore had no duty to 
warn plaintiff of such dangers. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the 
trial court should have instructed that there 
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvi-
ous danger so as to have avoided any possi-
ble misunderstanding. Steele v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 16 
Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964); see also 
EUertson v. Dansie, Utah, 576 P.2d 867 
(1978). Nevertheless, the failure to do so 
was harmless. 
There was no evidence that the specific 
dangers for which the defendant could be 
held responsible and which could have 
caused the injury—the lack of certain blade 
guards and the creeping of the saw—were 
such obvious and common hazards as to be 
apparent to a layman or one with plaintiffs 
background. The evidence which did relate 
to the obviousness of the danger of the saw 
went to its inherent danger rather than the 
specific dangers created by the lack of 
blade guards and the tendency of the saw 
to creep forward. As to these defects, 
there was expert testimony that the saw 
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was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
But there was no testimony that the creep-
ing was obvious to one in plaintiffs shoes or 
that the plaintiff knew or should have 
known about the availability of the blade 
guards. 
[2] In answer to a special interrogatory, 
the jurors specifically found that plaintiff 
was negligent, but that his negligence was 
not a proximate cause of the injury. On 
the other hand, the jury specifically found 
that defendant was negligent and that its 
negligence was a proximate cause of the 
injury. To accept defendant's theory that 
the injury resulted from the failure to warn 
or correct an obvious danger would result in 
a finding that plaintiff's negligence was a 
proximate cause of the injury—in direct 
conflict with the jury's finding on proxi-
mate cause. The jury's responses to the 
special interrogatories are consistent only 
on the proposition that the injury resulted 
from a nonobvious danger. Therefore, be-
cause a jury's answers to special interroga-
tories must, if at all possible, be read har-
moniously, Weber Basin Water Conservan-
cy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 
81 (1960); Van Cleve v. Betts, 16 Wash. 
App. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977), and in light 
of the presumption that the jury followed 
the instructions, we must reject defendant's 
theory. Clearly, under the instructions, the 
jury could have found plaintiffs negligence 
a proximate cause but chose not to do so. 
In sum, although Instruction 22 did not 
state that defendant had a duty to warn of 
obvious dangers,3 the error was harmless 
because there was no "reasonable likelihood 
. . . that . . . there would have been a re-
sult more favorable" to defendant had the 
instruction been as requested. Rowley v. 
Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 451, 
491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). See also Lee v. 
3. Instruction No. 22, which was given by the 
court, stated: 
If you find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, at the time of his injury, Mr. 
Moore was defendant's "business invitee," as 
that term is defined hereinafter, then defend-
ant's duty to Mr. Moore was to refrain from 
any acts of negligence toward him; to exer-
cise reasonable care to keep the premises, 
Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv., 
Utah, 606 P.2d 259 (1980). 
The next issue arises out of the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury on as-
sumption of risk. Both plaintiff and de-
fendant submitted proposed instructions on 
the issue. The judge's rationale for his 
ruling was- as follows: 
I think it is a negligence case, is what it 
is, a comparative negligence case. I 
think the instructions ought to be limited 
to that, excluding assumption of the risk 
which, under comparative negligence, is 
part of comparative [contributory] negli-
gence. 
Undoubtedly, in so ruling the court had in 
mind § 78-27-37 U.C.A. (1953), which pro-
vides: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar re-
covery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence or gross negligence result-
ing in death or in injury to person or 
property, if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negli-
gence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person recovering. As used in this 
act, "contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
With time it has become clear that the 
assumption of risk defense in fact included 
at least three different legal concepts. See 
Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Structo-Lite 
Engineering, Inc., Utah, 619 P.2d 306 
(1980), and authorities there cited. One 
form of assumption of risk has been re-
ferred to by some as primary assumption of 
risk, which may be either expressed or im-
plied. The "primary express" form involves 
an agreement by the plaintiff to accept the 
including the radial arm saw thereon, in a 
condition reasonably safe for purposes con-
sistent with his presence there: and to warn 
him of any and aii dangers involving the 
operation of szid saw which were known to 
the defendant or should have become known 
to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence and the performance of reasonable 
inspections. 
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risk or danger, and the "primary implied" 
form involves a relationship in which de-
fendant simply owes no duty of care to the 
plaintiff. Secondary assumption of risk is, 
as stated, the unreasonable encountering of 
a known and appreciated risk and in reality 
an aspect of contributory negligence. 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water User's Ass'n, 
Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977); Jacobsen Con-
struction Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc., supra. 
[3] Both assumption of risk and contrib-
utory negligence are founded on unreason-
able conduct. Each concept focuses on a 
different aspect of unreasonableness in the 
face of a risk of harm. A plaintiff's failure 
to foresee a danger which a reasonable per-
son acting in a prudent manner would have 
foreseen is designated negligent conduct. 
Assumption of risk designates conduct of a 
person who unreasonably takes a known 
and appreciated risk. 
[4, 5] Assumption of risk, as that term is 
used in § 78-27-37, is a voluntary and 
unreasonable exposure to a known danger. 
Jacobsen Construction Company v. Structo-
Lite Engineering, Inc., supra. The com-
plete bar to recovery in an action for negli-
gence, which assumption of risk has been 
historically, has been lifted by the Utah 
comparative negligence statute to avoid the 
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result 
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former 
rule of law.4 Secondary assumption of risk 
is treated in the same manner as contribu-
tory negligence for the purpose of appor-
tioning fault under the comparative negli-
gence statute. Rigtrup v. Strawberry 
Water User's Ass% Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 
(1977). The relationship between the two 
concepts was explained in Jacobsen Con-
struction Company v. Structo-Lite Engi-
neering, Inc., supra at 312: 
. . . the reasonableness of plaintiffs con-
duct in confronting a known or unknown 
risk created by defendant's negligence 
will basically be determined under princi-
ples of contributory negligence. Atten-
4. Comparative pnncipies as to a plaintiffs and 
defendant's liability in causing personal injury 
were recently held to apply in strict liability 
tion should be focused on whether a rea-
sonably prudent man in the exercise of 
due care would have incurred the risk, 
despite his knowledge of it, and if so, 
whether he would have conducted himself 
in the manner in which the plaintiff acted 
in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, including the appreciated risk. 
See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d 
61 (1968). Then, if plaintiff's unreason-
ableness is viewed to be less than that of 
defendant, according to the terms of the 
statute, "any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person re-
covering." [Footnote omitted.] 
In light of the difficulties arising from 
the several meetings, of the term assump-
tion of risk, some authorities have advocat-
ed the complete abolition of the term "as-
sumption of risk" and the utilization of 
other legal terminology to describe the con-
duct. See 2 Harper and James, Law of 
Torts § 21.8 at 1191-92 (1956); Flemming, 
Law of Torts, 241-58 (2nd ed. 1961). We 
agree. 
Defendant maintains that Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, Utah, 563 
P.2d 1247 (1977), held that assumption of 
risk is still a complete bar to recovery. 
Insofar as that part of assumption of risk 
which is an aspect of contributory negli-
gence is concerned, that case did not so 
hold. Rigtrup recognized that "where there 
is a known danger, the risk of which is 
voluntarily assumed by a party, such action 
may well fall within the lack of due care 
which constitutes negligence and may also 
be correctly termed an assumption of risk." 
[563 P.2d at 1250.] The Court referred to 
the statutory language that "contributory 
negligence includes assumption of risk" un-
der the comparative negligence statute and 
stated that the statute "indicates a clear 
legislative intent to recognize the doctrine 
of 'assumption of risk* as an aspect of con-
tributory negligence in Utah law." [Ibid.] 
The Court held assumption of risk should be 
cases. Mulherin v. IngersoH-Rand Co., Utah, 
628 P.2d 1301 (1931). 
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treated in a comparative manner as an as-
pect of contributory negligence. Neverthe-
less, the Court did approve the giving of 
instructions on both assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence. 
[6] Even though decided after the ap-
peal in this case, the principles governing 
the relationship of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk enunciated in Jacob-
sen are controlling here. Since the duty of 
the plaintiff and the consequences of a 
breach thereof were explained to the jury 
in appropriate language, there was no error 
in not giving an instruction on secondary 
assumption of risk in addition to a contribu-
tory negligence instruction. In short, we do 
not think that instructions on both contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of risk in 
this case were necessary. To the extent 
that Rigtrup is inconsistent with this opin-
ion, it is hereby overruled. It follows from 
what has been stated that it was not error 
to refuse to require the jury to make a 
specific additional finding in the language 
of assumption of risk beyond that required 
in the contributory negligence interrogato-
ry. Further support for the conclusion is 
found in the fact that defendant's proposed 
assumption of risk instructions, which were 
not given, were erroneous and could not 
have provided a foundation for the inter-
rogatory.5 
Finally, there is no contention in this case 
that there was an agreement whereby 
plaintiff agreed to accept the danger here, 
nor was the relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant such that defendant had no 
duty of care to the plaintiff. 
5. Indeed, defendant's proposed Instruction 
Nos. 11 and 12 on "assumption of risk" clearly 
incorporated classical contributory negligence 
language: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
There is a legal principal [sic] commonly 
referred to by the term "assumption of risk" 
which is as follows: 
One is said to assume a risk when he vol-
untarily manifests his assent to a dangerous 
condition and voluntarily exposes himself to 
that danger when he knows, or in the exer-
cise of ordinary care would know, that a 
danger exists in the condition of the equip-
ment or premises and uses the equipment 
and premises and voluntarily places himself 
or remains, within the position of danger. 
[7] Defendant's final claim on appeal is 
that the jury should have been instructed 
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negli-
gent and that the negligence was the sole 
cause of the injury, or alternatively that it 
was a proximate cause of the injury. The 
court correctly refused to give the instruc-
tion. Clearly there were factual issues both 
as to negligence on the part of both parties 
and as to the cause of the injury, and we 
are obliged to sustain the jury's findings 
because there was substantial evidence in 
the record to support those findings. Malt-
by v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 
336 (1979); Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 
2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to 
plaintiff. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and WILKINS, J.,* 
concur. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
It appears from the evidence that one of 
three things, or a combination thereof, 
could have caused plaintiff's injuries: 1) 
lack of a blade guard, 2) creeping of the 
blade, or 3) plaintiffs inattention. 
The record contains no direct evidence 
that the lack of a blade guard or the creep-
ing of the saw blade actually caused the 
accident. Plaintiff's expert witness did tes-
tify, however, as to the obvious nature of 
those two dangers. He opined that it was 
"plain to see" that the saw was "unreasona-
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Before the doctrine of assumption of risk is 
applicable, you must find: (1) the person in 
question must have actual knowledge of the 
danger, or the conditions must be such that 
he would have such knowledge if he exer-
cised ordinary care, (2) he must have free-
dom of choice. This freedom of choice must 
have come from circumstances that provide 
him a reasonable opportunity, without violat-
ing any legal or moral duty to safely refuse to 
expose himself to the danger in question. 
An interrogatory based on chose definitions of 
assumption oi risk would have ozen improper. 
* Wilkins, Justice, acted on this case prior to his 
resignation. 
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bly dangerous" since, it lacked a blade 
guard, and since it "had a tendency to 
move" forward from the rest position. 
These dangers were certainly obvious to 
him since he based his opinion, not upon his 
operation or testing of the saw, but simply 
upon his brief observation of it, from which 
he theorized that the blade, turning up to 
4,000 rpm, would cause "some movement of 
the blade." Anyone with plaintiff's experi-
ence and familiarity with saws could, and 
should have readily made the same observa-
tion before proceeding to use the saw. 
Plaintiffs testimony as to causation was: 
I took the two-by-four and I slid it in 
front of the one-by-four [guide] towards 
the nail [gauge] and against the one-by-
four . . . . As I glanced over now to 
focus my attention on that nail and to 
make sure this edge of the two-by-four 
was up against the one-by-four, I felt the 
saw grab my thumb and yank my hand 
into the blade . . . . 
In light of the foregoing explanation of 
the event by plaintiff, it matters not wheth-
er the "tendency of the blade to move" was 
an obvious danger, since it seems that it 
could not have been a cause of the accident 
anyway. This is to be seen in that had the 
blade in fact crept forward, it would neces-
sarily have come to rest when it came in 
contact with the two-by-four plaintiff was 
positioning to cut. Certainly, without man-
ual assistance, the blade could not have cut 
through the two-by-four which it would 
have had to do to reach plaintiff's hand. 
This assumes, of course, that plaintiff's 
hand was properly positioned on the front 
side of the two-by-four, away from the 
blade. 
Inasmuch as the jury found negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff, it apparently con-
cluded that plaintiff did not properly posi-
tion his hand on the front side of the two-
1. State v. Ouzounian, 2S Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 
1093 (1971); see also, Rowley v. Graven Broth-
ers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 443, 491 P.2d 1209 
(1971). 
2. Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977). 
3. U.C.A.1953, 73-27-37. 
by-four, away from the blade, but that by 
inattention or otherwise, he reached over 
the two-by-four to the back side thereof, 
and into the blade. 
When viewed in light of all of the facts 
of this case, I deem the error in failing to 
give an "obvious danger" instruction as not 
merely harmless. The failure to give an 
instruction to which a party is entitled may 
constitute reversible error if it tends to: 1) 
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party; or 2) insufficiently or 
erroneously advises the jury as to the law.1 
In this case, the absence of an obvious dan-
ger instruction may well have prevented a 
proper determination as to whether defend-
ant was negligent in the first instance. 
Therefore, I view the error as prejudicial. 
What has heretofore been said applies 
equally to the court's refusal to instruct the 
jury on the doctrine of assumption of risk. 
Notwithstanding the position taken by the 
main opinion, I view the case of Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Association2 as 
standing for the proposition that the doc-
trine of assumption of risk remains a viable 
defense, it being consistent with the con-
cepts of comparative fault as delineated in 
the Comparative Negligence Act.3 More-
over, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., specifically desig-
nates both assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence jas affirmative defenses. 
Application of the doctrine of assumption 
of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff of a 
specific defect or dangerous condition.4 As-
sumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence are distinct legal doctrines. The for-
mer applies where one voluntarily exposes 
himself to known danger, and the latter 
applies where one negligently fails to dis-
cover the danger.5 Situations may arise 
where the two doctrines may overlap as 
noted by Bean Prosser: 
4. Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 
P.2d 404 (I960);; Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 
2d 263. 342 ?.2d !334 (1059); see also. Foster v. 
Steed, 23 Utah U 143, 453 ?.2d 1021 (1969). 
5. Kuchenmeistzrv. Los Angeles and S.L.R. Co., 
52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918); see also, Clay 
v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952). 
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Obviously the two may co-exist when the 
plaintiff makes an unreasonable choice to 
incur the risk; but either may exist with-
out the other. The significant difference, 
when there is one, is likely to be one 
between risks which were in fact known 
to the plaintiff, and risks which he mere-
ly might have discovered by the exercise 
of ordinary care.6 
In the past, the terms have often been 
rather loosely applied. This was so because 
each was a complete defense to a negli-
gence action, that is, whether one knowing-
ly or negligently "assumed the risk," the 
result was the same—no recovery. When 
the legislature passed our Comparative 
Negligence Act, supra, it specifically recog-
nized the doctrine of "assumption of the 
risk" and included it within the term "con-
tributory negligence." Since the enactment 
thereof, this Court has held that assumption 
of risk remains a viable defense in Utah. 
In Rigtrup, supra, this Court approved the 
giving of instructions both on contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. The 
matter was stated therein as follows: 
Though there have been some differ-
ences in view as to the defense of as-
sumption of risk and its relation to other 
aspects of contributory negligence, it has 
since time immemorial been regarded as 
a valid defense in the law of this State. 
It has sometimes been said to be but a 
specialized aspect of contributory negli-
gence in that it can be intermingled and 
fused with other aspects thereof in cer-
tain circumstances. It is also sometimes 
said to be something separate from con-
tributory negligence, as it undoubtedly 
can be in some circumstances. However, 
it requires but little reflection to see that 
where there is a known danger, the risk 
of which is voluntarily assumed by a par-
ty, such action may well fall within the 
lack of due care which constitutes negli-
gence and also may be correctly termed 
6. Handbook of the Law of Torts, William Pros-
ser (4th ed.). § 68, at p. 441. 
7. Jacobsen Const. Co. v. Stmcto-Lite Engineer-
ing, Inc., Utah, 619 ?.2d 306 (1930). It is to be 
noted that the holding in Jacobsen did not aboi-
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an assumption of risk. [Citations omit-
ted.] If such be the situation, the party 
should be charged with the responsibility 
for his conduct, by whatever term it may 
be called; and the comparative negli-
gence statute quoted above should be ap-
plied. . . . 
That our conclusion just stated is the 
correct one under our law is supported, 
not only by the reasoning just stated and 
the cases cited, but is made abundantly 
clear by the fact that the legislature, 
apparently in order to avoid any misun-
derstanding thereon, appended the last 
sentence as quoted above that: as used in 
this act, "contributory negligence" in-
cludes "assumption of the risk." That 
sentence indicates a clear legislative in-
tent to recognize the doctrine of "as-
sumption of risk" as an aspect of contrib-
utory negligence in Utah law. Therefore 
any attempt on
 m our part to judicially 
abolish that defense would amount to a 
direct repudiation of the legislative ex-
pression and thus a clear usurpation of 
the legislative prerogative.9 
9 See Becker v. Beaverton School Dist, 25 
Or.App. 879, 551 P.2d 498, where the court 
refused to rule that a comparative negligence 
statute had completely abolished the defense 
of assumption of the risk. 
Therefore, the negligence of a plaintiff 
who knowingly and voluntarily encounters 
a risk is to be compared with any of that of 
a defendant pursuant to the provisions of 
the Comparative Negligence Act, supra? 
In the instant case, plaintiffs knowledge 
and appreciation of the danger involved in 
operating the saw was a question for the 
jury,8 and it was error for the court not to 
give an appropriate instruction on such as-
sumption of risk. 
I would reverse and remand for the pur-
pose of a new trial. 
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, J. 
ish assumption of risk as a defense, but only 
suggeste-J the abolition of "assumption of risk" 
terminology. 
8. Wold v. Csdsn City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d 
453 (1953). 
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JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPA-
NY, INC., a corporation; Jelco, Incorpo-
rated, a corporation; and Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District, a body cor-
porate and politic, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, 
v. 
STRUCTO-UTE ENGINEERING, INC., 
a corporation, Defendant and 
Appellant 
No. 16208. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 1, 1980. 
Contractors building water treatment 
plant filed action against subcontractors 
who constructed chemical storage tanks on 
theories of negligence and breach of ex-
press warranty for faulty construction of 
such storage tanks. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake, James S. Sawaya, J., en-
tered judgment on a verdict which had been 
directed against subcontractors and reduced 
damages based on contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk. Appeals were tak-
en. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) under Utah's comparative negli-
gence statute, "assumption of risk" lan-
guage is not appropriate to describe the 
various concepts previously dealt with un-
der that terminology, but is to be treated, 
in its secondary sense, as contributory negli-
gence, and reasonableness of plaintiffs con-
duct in confronting a known or unknown 
risk created by defendant's negligence will 
basically be determined under principles of 
contributory negligence, and (2) in a negli-
gence action wherein assumption of risk is 
raised, attention should be focused upon 
whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
exercise of due care would have incurred 
the risk, despite his knowledge of it, and, if 
so, whether he would have conducted him-
self in the manner in which plaintiff acted 
in light of all surrounding circumstances, 
including the appreciated risk, and then, if 
plaintiffs unreasonableness is viewed to be 
less than that of defendant, according to 
the terms of comparative negligence stat-
ute, any damages allowed shall be diminish-
ed in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Hall, J., concurred in the result. 
Crockett, C. J., concurred in the result 
and filed opinion. 
1. Contracts <s=>350(l) 
Negligence <s=> 135(1) 
In negligence and express warranty ac-
tion by contractor building water treatment 
plant against subcontractors who construct-
ed chemical storage tanks, evidence sup-
ported verdict of contributory negligence, 
and, furthermore, supported jury's finding 
of assumption of risk. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-
37. 
2. Negligence <s=>105 
For purposes of action brought by con-
tractors building water treatment plant 
against subcontractors who constructed 
chemical storage tanks, term "assumption 
of risk" meant voluntary, yet unreasonable, 
encounter with known, appreciated risk. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Negligence s=>97 
The complete bar to recovery which 
"assumption of risk" once constituted in a 
negligence action has been abolished by the 
comparative negligence statute to avoid the 
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result 
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former 
rule of law. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
4. Negligence ®=>105 
In its primary sense, assumption of risk 
is alternative expression for proposition 
that defendant was not negligent, that is, 
there was no duty owed or there was no 
breach of existing duties; in its secondary 
sense, assumption of risk is affirmative de-
fense to established breach of duty and as 
such is phase of contributory negligence. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-57. 
5. Negligence <s=»97 
Under Utah's comparative negligence 
statute, "assumption of risk" language is 
not appropriate to describe various concepts 
previously dealt with under that terminolo-
gy but is to be treated, in its secondary 
App. v i i 
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sense, as contributory negligence; specifi-
cally, reasonableness of plaintiffs' conduct 
in confronting known or unknown risk cre-
ated by defendant's negligence will basical-
ly be determined under principles of con-
tributory negligence. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-
37. 
6. Negligence <s=>98 
For purposes of assumption of risk de-
fense under comparative negligence statute, 
attention should be focused on whether rea-
sonably prudent man in exercise of due care 
would have incurred risk, despite his knowl-
edge of it, and, if so, whether he would 
have conducted himself in manner in which 
plaintiff acted in light of all surrounding 
circumstances, including appreciated risk; 
then, if plaintiffs unreasonableness is 
viewed to be less than that of defendant, 
according to terms of comparative negli-
gence statute, any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to amount of neg-
ligence attributable to person recovering. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
7. Contracts to 354 
Negligence <*»142 
In action brought by contractors build-
ing water treatment plant against subcon-
tractors who constructed chemical storage 
tanks on theories of negligence and breach 
of express warranty wherein jury appor-
tioned by percentage fault of each party 
without differentiating between negligence 
and breach of express warranty causes of 
action, since same conduct of defendant 
constituted both negligence and breach of 
warranty and jury was instructed that 
damages arising from breach of warranty 
were same as for negligence, finding of 
assumption of risk applied equally to both 
negligence and warranty claims. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-27-37. 
Raymond M. Berry and H. James Clegg 
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Harold 
A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Arthur H. Nielsen and W. Waldan Lloyd 
of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck, 
Edward W. Clyde of Clyde & Pratt, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This appeal by defendant is from a judg-
ment awarding plaintiffs damages resulting 
from defendant's faulty construction of a 
fiberglass storage tank. Defendant's claim 
is that the jury's finding of assumption of 
risk entirely precludes a judgment for 
plaintiff under both of plaintiffs' theories 
of recovery: negligence and breach of ex-
press warranty. The central issues raised 
are (1) whether assumption of risk is a 
complete bar to plaintiffs' recovery under 
Utah's comparative negligence statute, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, § 78-
27-37, and (2) whether assumption of risk 
constitutes a defense to an action for 
breach of express warranty. 
Plaintiffs Jacobsen Construction Compa-
ny and Jelco, Inc. ("Jacobsen-Jelco"), act-
ing as joint venturers, contracted with 
plaintiff Central Utah Water Conservancy 
District ("Conservancy District") to build a 
water treatment plant. Jacobsen-Jelco en-
tered into a subcontract with defendant 
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. ("Structo-
Lite") whereby Structo-Lite would provide 
six fiberglass chemical storage tanks con-
structed in accordance with the plans and 
specifications of the project engineers, 
third-party defendant Templeton, Linke 
and Associates. 
Mr. Bevan, president of Structo-Lite, 
represented to Jacobsen's agent that Struc-
to-Lite would fabricate fiberglass tanks 
which would meet the plans and specifica-
tions of the project engineers. Mr. Bevan 
personally signed the purchase order which 
provided that Structo-Lite would supply 
the tanks in conformity with all engineer-
ing plans and specifications and that they 
would be warranted by Structo-Lite as to 
quality of workmanship and materials. 
After defendant delivered the tanks to 
the job site, the project superintendent for 
Jacobsen-Jelco observed that some of the 
temporary supports used to maintain round-
ness had failed in transit, causing the tanks 
to appear elliptical at the open end and 
resulting in damage to the flanges located 
at the tops of the tanks. Mr. Bevan, upon 
being informed of these findings, indicated 
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that he would make the necessary repairs 
and install the remaining connections. 
Prior to completion of the job, all six 
tanks were filled with water to test for 
leaks. Four of the six tanks were found to 
have minor leaks. The tank which subse-
quently failed was not one of the four. 
Structo-Lite, upon being informed of the 
leaks, made the necessary repairs. 
Upon completion of the project and prior 
to operation, a seven-day test of the facili-
ties was conducted. The plant, upon pass-
ing the test, was declared ready for opera-
tion. 
Liquid alum was poured into one of the 
tanks in May of 1974. The following July a 
tank which subsequently exploded was 
filled with alum. The day after the chemi-
cal was placed in the tank, the plant opera-
tor noticed a minute leak. Before he could 
lessen the pressure, the tank exploded, 
spreading the liquid chemical throughout 
the entire building. Substantial damage to 
the heating and electrical system in the 
plant resulted. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negli-
gence in the construction of the tanks and 
breach of contract and express warranty 
for failure to construct the tanks according 
to the specifications agreed upon. Structo-
Lite filed a third-party complaint against 
Templeton, Linke and Associates for inade-
quate design and specifications. 
After all testimony was submitted, the 
trial court directed a verdict against Struc-
to-Lite on the ground that the evidence 
showed as a matter of law that the tanks 
had been negligently manufactured. De-
fendant then requested that special inter-
rogatories be submitted to the jury. In 
answer to the interrogatories, the jury 
found Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy Dis-
trict had been contributorily negligent and 
had assumed the risk of the incurred dam-
ages. In apportioning the proximate con-
tribution of each party toward the loss, the 
jury found Structo-Lite 70% liable and Ja-
cobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District 20% 
and 10% responsible, respectively. The jury 
found Templeton, Linke and Associates, 
third-party defendants, not negligent. 
[1] Plaintiffs cross-appeal, contending 
that they were entitled to a finding, as a 
matter of law, that they were not contribu-
torily negligent and that they had not as-
sumed the risk of defendant's negligence. 
The evidence shows that Jacobsen-Jelco 
was aware that the tanks were "out-of-
round," a visual inspection evidencing a 
three to four inch differential in tank diam-
eter from the high to the low spot on the 
tank. Jacobsen-Jelco was also aware of an 
elliptical shape and damaged flanges locat-
ed at the top end of the tanks resulting 
from failure of the bracing supports during 
transit to the water plant. Conservancy 
District noticed during construction of the 
tanks that they did not all have smooth 
surfaces and detected spots where the wo-
ven roving was not covered by the fiber-
glass matting. Further, after installation 
at the plant site, flat spots and irregulari-
ties on the tanks were noticed. 
After the water testing revealed leaks in 
several of the tanks, plaintiffs, knowing 
that alum solution was heavier than water, 
proceeded to fill the tanks with alum solu-
tion without any further testing for tensile 
strength. Moreover, testing by the Ameri-
can Testing Laboratories at the direction of 
Jacobsen-Jelco revealed some deficiencies 
in the fabrication of the tanks. Plaintiffs' 
knowledge of these defects must be viewed 
in light of the warranty given by defend-
ants that the tanks would conform to the 
specifications of the general contract, in-
cluding a tensile strength of 100,000 psi and 
a flexal strength of 150,000 psi with a "very 
smooth, hard surface and good finishing 
properties." 
We review the facts and the inferences to 
be drawn therefrom in favor of the verdict 
and conclude that the verdict as to contrib-
utory negligence is supported by the evi-
dence. Furthermore, there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence to find that plaintiffs 
unreasonably proceeded in light of their 
knowledge and appreciation of the risk cre-
ated by defendant, and we thus uphold the 
jury's finding of plaintiffs' assumption of 
risk. 
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[2,3] We next address the contention 
raised by defendant that plaintiffs' assump-
tion of risk should completely bar recovery. 
The term "assumption of risk" has been 
historically defined and applied in different 
ways. Under the circumstances in this 
case, the term "assumption of risk" meant 
the voluntary, yet unreasonable, encounter 
of a known, appreciated risk. The complete 
bar to recovery which such conduct once 
constituted in a negligence action has been 
abolished by the Utah comparative negli-
gence statute to avoid the harshness visited 
upon plaintiffs as a result of the all-or-
nothing nature of the former rule of law. 
Section 78-27-37 provides: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar re-
covery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence or gross negligence result-
ing in death or in injury to person or 
property, if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negli-
gence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person recovering. As used in this 
act, "contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
The legislative intent to include assump-
tion of risk within contributory negligence 
terminology and eliminate the use of the 
term is consistent with a recent trend es-
tablished by other courts, legislatures, and 
legal commentators alike. 
The 1973 Oregon Legislature passed the 
Oregon Comparative Negligence Statute 
which is basically identical to Utah's com-
parative negligence statute. Two years la-
ter, in an apparent attempt to clarify its 
intent, the Legislature amended the Act. 
ORS 18.470 Oregon Laws, 1975, Chapter 
599, § 4(2) now reads: "The doctrine of 
implied assumption of the risk is abolished." 
Connecticut has likewise abolished the term 
1. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion 
in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 
54, 68, 63 S.Ct. 444, 451, 87 L.Ed. 610 (1943), 
commented upon this confusion: 
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an ex-
cellent illustration of the extent to which un-
by statute. G.S.C.A. § 52-572h (1973). See 
also North Dakota Statute N.D.C.C. § 9-
10-06 (1973); Wentz v. Deseth, N.D., 221 
N.W.2d 101 (1974). 
The term "assumption of risk" has caused 
considerable confusion in its indiscriminate 
use.1 Its overuse in the number and variety 
of definitions of the term have brought 
disfavor to the defense, and the trend has 
been to eliminate its use in favor of negli-
gence language. See Keeton, Assumption 
of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La.L. 
Rev. 122, 123-30 (1961); Prosser, Law of 
Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971); 2 Harper and 
James, The Law of Torts § 21.1 (1956). 
Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 
N.W.2d 136, 148-49 n.4 (1965), quoted Pro-
fessor James: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk, 
however it is analyzed and defined, is in 
most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine 
which restricts liability and so cuts down 
the compensation of accident victims. It 
is a heritage of the extreme individualism 
of the early industrial revolution. But 
quite aside from any questions of policy 
or of substance, the concept of assuming 
the risk is purely duplicative of other 
more widely understood concepts, such as 
scope of duty or contributory negligence. 
The one exception is to be found, perhaps, 
in those cases where there is an actual 
agreement. Moreover, the expression has 
come to stand for two or three distinct 
notions which are not at all the same, 
though they often overlap in the sense 
that they are applicable to the same situ-
ation. 
"Except for express assumption of risk, 
therefore, the term and the concept 
should be abolished. It adds nothing to 
modern law except confusion. For the 
most part the policy of individualism it 
represents is outmoded in accident laws; 
where it is not, that policy can find full 
critical use of words bedevils the law. A 
phrase begins life as a literary expression; its 
felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repe-
tition soon establishes it as a legal formula, 
undiscriminatingly used to express different 
and sometimes contradictory ideas. 
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scope and far better expression in other 
language. There is only one thing that 
can be said for assumption of risk. In 
the confusion it introduces, it sometimes-
ironically and quite capriciously-leads to 
a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some 
other field. The aura of disfavor that 
has come to surround it may occasionally 
turn out to be the kiss of death to some 
other bad rule with which it has become 
associated. We have seen how this may 
happen with the burden of pleading and 
proving an exceptional limitation on the 
scope of defendant's duty. There may be 
other instances. But at best this sort of 
thing is a poor excuse indeed for continu-
ing the confusion of an unfortunate form 
of words." 
[James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 
141, 168-69 (1952).] 
For purposes of analysis, assumption of 
risk is often divided into three categories. 
Those courts which attempt to deal with the 
various concepts subsumed under the one 
label refrain from considering one form, 
that is, the "express" form of assumption of 
risk. See Blackburn v. Dorta, Fla., 348 
So.2d 287, 289 (1977); Meistrich v. Casino 
Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44; 155 A.2d 
90 (1959). An express assumption of risk 
involves a contractual provision in which a 
party expressly contracts not to sue for 
injury or loss which may thereafter be occa-
sioned by the acts of another. We not only 
follow suit by refraining to include this 
form of assumption of risk in our discus-
sion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity 
for including this form within assumption 
of risk terminology. As stated in James, 
Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141 (1952), 
the field of contract law is more than ade-
quate to deal with this bar to recovery. 
[4] We are thus left with the primary 
and secondary forms of assumption of risk. 
In its primary sense, it is an alternative 
expression for the proposition that defend-
ant was not negligent, that is, there was no 
duty owed or there was no breach of an 
existing duty. In its secondary sense, as-
sumption of risk is an affirmative defense 
to an established breach of duty and as such 
is a phase of contributory negligence. As 
stated in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attrac-
tions, Inc., supra: 
We here speak solely of the area in 
which injury or damage was neither in-
tended nor expressly contracted to be 
nonactionable. In this area, assumption 
of risk has two distinct meanings. In one 
sense (sometimes called its "primary" 
sense), it is an alternate expression for 
the proposition that defendant was not 
negligent, j . e., either owed no duty or did 
not breach the duty owed. In its other 
sense (sometimes called "secondary"), as-
sumption of risk is an affirmative defense 
to an established breach of duty. In its 
primary sense, it is accurate to say plain-
tiff assumed the risk whether or not he 
was "at fault", for the truth thereby ex-
pressed in alternate terminology is that 
defendant was not negligent. But in its 
secondary sense, i. e., as an affirmative 
defense to an established breach of de-
fendant's duty, it is incorrect to say plain-
tiff assumed the risk whether or not he 
was at fault. 
* * * * * * 
Hence we think it clear that assump-
tion of risk in its secondary sense is a 
mere phase of contributory negligence, 
the total issue being whether a reason-
ably prudent man in the exercise of due 
care (a) would have incurred the known 
risk and (b) if he would, whether such a 
person in the light of all of the circum-
stances including the appreciated risk 
would have conducted himself in the 
manner in which plaintiff acted. 
Thus in the area under discussion there 
are but two basic issues: (1) defendant's 
negligence, and (2) plaintiffs contributo-
ry negligence. In view of the considera-
tions discussed above, it has been urged 
that assumption of risk in both its pri-
mary and secondary senses serves merely 
to confuse and should be eliminated. Ed-
itorial, Assumption of the Risk-A False 
Issue, 73 NJ.L.J. 346 (1950); James, As-
sumption of Risk, 61 Yale LJ. 141, 169 
(1952); 2 Harper and James, Law of 
Torts (1956), § 221.8, p. 1191. 
* * * * * * 
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Perhaps a well-guarded charge of as-
sumption of risk in its primary sense will 
aid comprehension. But we cannot see 
how a charge of the concept in its second-
ary sense will contribute a net gain. [155 
A.2d at 93, 94-95.] 
The New Jersey court disposed of the last 
vestiges of assumption of risk four years 
later in McGrath v. American Cyanamid 
Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238, 239-41 
(1963): 
In Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attrac-
tions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82 
A.L.R.2d 1208 (1959), we pointed out that 
assumption of the risk was theretofore 
used in two incongruous senses: in one 
sense it meant the defendant was not 
negligent, while in its other sense it 
meant the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. We said that in truth there 
are but two issues-negligence and con-
tributory negligence-both to be resolved 
by the standard of the reasonably pru-
dent man, and that it was erroneous to 
suggest to the jury that assumption of 
the risk was still another issue. 
It was our hope that after Meistrich 
the bench and bar would focus upon the 
true issues, but unhappily some cling to 
the terminology of assumption of risk and 
continue to be misled by it even while 
purporting to think of it as merely a 
covertible equivalent of negligence or 
contributory negligence. 
* * * * « * 
In Meistrich we said the terminology of 
assumption of the risk should not be used 
when it is projected in its secondary 
sense, i. e., that of contributory negli-
gence (31 N.J., at p. 55, 155 A.2d at p. 96, 
82 A.L.R.2d 1208). We thought, however, 
that '[pjerhaps a well-guarded charge of 
assumption of risk in its primary sense 
will aid comprehension' (31 N.J. p. 54,155 
A.2d p. 96, 82 A.L.R.2d 1208). * * * Ex-
perience, however, indicates the term 'as-
sumption of risk* is so apt to create mist 
that it is better banished from the scene. 
We hope we have heard the last of it. 
Henceforth let us stay with "negligence" 
and "contributory negligence." 
The New Jersey decisions quoted above 
have been cited approvingly by several jur-
isdictions adopting the same approach. 
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d 61 
(1968); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 
P.2d 714 (1968) (Spear, J., concurring spe-
cially); Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 
133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Williamson v. 
Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1972). 
Other courts have likewise abolished the use 
of assumption of risk terminology, accept-
ing the argument that assumption of risk 
serves no purpose which is not served either 
by the doctrine of contributory negligence 
or the common law concept of duty. Bol-
due v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 
(1962); McConville v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113 
N.W.2d 14 (1962). See also Petrone v. Mar-
golis, 20 NJ.Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476 (1952). 
The policy set forth in our comparative 
negligence act parallels this trend. This 
Court was faced with construing the as-
sumption of risk doctrine in light of our 
comparative negligence act in Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Association, Utah, 
563 P.2d 1247 (1977). The Court recognized 
the various forms of conduct subsumed un-
der assumption of risk terminology but indi-
cated that retention of the term comported 
with the statute and that the term, properly 
construed, was not inconsistent with the 
comparative fault concept. 
What is important is the concept embod-
ied in the comparative negligence statute, 
and the particular labels assigned to the 
type of fault involved should not interfere 
therewith. The Court in Rigtrup alluded to 
this form of analysis by focusing on the 
underlying conduct rather than the tradi-
tional terminology in the following state-
ment: I 
[Assumption of risk] has sometimes been 
said to be but a specialized aspect of 
contributory negligence in that it can be 
intermingled and fused with other as-
pects thereof in certain circumstances. It 
is also sometimes said to be something 
separate from contributory negligence, as 
it undoubtedly can be in some circum-
stances. However, it requires but little 
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reflection to see that where there is a 
known danger, the risk of which is volun-
tarily assumed by a party, such action 
may well fail within the lack of due care 
which constitutes negligence and also 
may be correctly termed an assumption 
of risk. If such be the situation, the 
party should be charged with the respon-
sibility for his conduct, by whatever term 
it may be called; and the comparative 
negligence statute quoted above should 
be applied as the trial court correctly did 
in this case. [Footnotes omitted; empha-
sis added.] [563 P.2d at 1250.] 
[5,6] We thus hold that under our com-
parative negligence statute "assumption of 
risk" language is not appropriate to de-
scribe the various concepts previously dealt 
with under that terminology but is to be 
treated, in its secondary sense, as contribu-
tory negligence. Specifically, and with par-
ticular reference to our comparative negli-
gence act, the reasonableness of plaintiffs 
conduct in confronting a known or un-
known risk created by defendant's negli-
gence will basically be determined under 
principles of contributory negligence.2 At-
tention should be focused on whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the exercise of 
due care would have incurred the risk, de-
spite his knowledge of it, and if so, whether 
he would have conducted himself in the 
manner in which the plaintiff acted in light 
of all the surrounding circumstances, in-
cluding the appreciated risk. See Leavitt v. 
Gillaspie, supra. Then, if plaintiff's unrea-
sonableness is viewed to be less than that of 
defendant, according to the terms of the 
statute, "any damages allowed shall be di-
minished in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person recov-
ering." 
[7] Defendants next contend that as-
sumption of risk should stand as a bar to 
recovery for breach of express warranty. 
2. When there is a knowing and express oral or 
written consent to the dangerous activity or 
condition, a contractual theory will suffice to 
bar recovery. 
3. We also note that this Court in Ernest W. 
Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., Utah, 601 P.2d 
152 (1979), stated in dictum that one who un-
In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 
488 P.2d 302 (1971), this Court held that a 
plaintiff who deliberately and unreasonably 
uses a product which he knows to be defec-
tive is precluded from recovering damages 
in an action for breach of express warran-
ty.3 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the 
principles of comparative fault should be 
extended to breach of warranty cases. Pur-
suant to that theory damages would be re-
duced to the extent of plaintiff's contribu-
tion to the fault. But no such proposal is 
before the Court, and we refrain from reap-
praising the status of the law as to assump-
tion of risk as a defense to breach of ex-
press warranty. 
In this case the jury apportioned by per-
centage the fault of each party without 
differentiating between the negligence and 
breach of express warranty causes of ac-
tion. Since the same conduct of defendant 
constituted both negligence and breach of 
warranty, and since the jury was instructed 
that the damages resulting from the breach 
of warranty were the same as for negli-
gence, the finding of assumption of risk 
applies equally to both the negligence and 
warranty claims. 
As to the remaining issues, we hold that 
the trial court acted within the confines of 
sound discretion on all counts. 
The judgment of the district court is af-
firmed. Costs to Respondents. 
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
HALL, J., concurs in result. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in 
result). 
I must confess my inability to see either 
necessity or desirability in the main opin-
ion's treatment of what impresses me as an 
reasonably proceeds to make use of a product 
which he knows to be dangerous cannot recov-
er under a strict products liability theory or 
breach of implied warranty theory. The Court 
did not address the issue of whether compara-
tive fault had any applicability in such a case. 
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effort to discredit the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk in order to decide this case. It 
is my view that the trial court gave a 
correct and appropriate instruction as ap-
plied to the evidence. That is sufficient to 
dispose of the issue. 
Though it may be true that assumption of 
risk is but a specialized aspect of contribu-
tory negligence, it has its uses in more 
closely focusing attention upon certain fact 
situations.1 The broad principle which un-
derlies contributory negligence is that the 
plaintiff fails to use reasonable care for his 
own safety. A particular aspect thereof is 
where he knows of a danger, and has a 
reasonable opportunity to make an alterna-
tive choice, but nevertheless voluntarily 
proceeds and assumes the risk of harm.2 
This Court has but recently dealt with 
this problem in Rigtrup v. Strawberry 
Water Users Ass'n* wherein we stated: 
Plaintiffs urge that inasmuch as the 
trial court had adequately instructed on 
contributory negligence, it was error to 
also instruct on assumption of risk. They 
argue that this defense is spurious and 
should be abolished, citing cases from 
states where they assert that has been 
done by judicial declaration.* We do not 
so read those cases. They deal for the 
most part with whether there are mean-
ingful distinctions between contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. How-
soever that might be, we decline the invi-
tation to so change our law. One of the 
important values in our system which 
tends to produce confidence in and re-
spect for the law is that the law as it is 
declared and known has sufficient soli-
darity and continuity that it can be relied 
on with assurance. We think that those 
objectives are best served by the judicial 
branch refraining from legislating any 
abrupt or dramatic changes of a substan-
tial nature in the law and by leaving any 
such changes therein to the legislature, 
whose constitutional prerogative it is.* 
1. See discussion by Justice Henriod, speaking 
for the Court, in Clay v. Dun ford, et ai, 121 
Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952). 
Though there have been some differ-
ences in view as to the defense of as-
sumption of risk and its relation to other 
aspects of contributory negligence, it has 
since time immemorial been regarded as 
a valid defense in th<e law of this State. 
That our conclusion just stated is the 
correct one under our law is supported, 
not only by the reasoning just stated and 
the cases cited, but is made abundantly 
clear by the fact that the legislature, 
apparently in order to avoid any misun-
derstanding thereon, appended the last 
sentence as quoted above that: as used in 
this act, "contributory negligence" in-
cludes "assumption o\f the risk/' That 
sentence indicates a clear legislative in-
tent to recognize the doctrine of "as-
sumption of risk" as a^n aspect of contrib-
utory negligence in Utah law. Therefore 
any attempt on our part to judicially 
abolish that defense would amount to a 
direct repudiation of the legislative ex-
pression and thus a clear usurpation of 
the legislative prerogative. * * * See ci-
tations in original. [Emphasis added.] 
In accordance with what has been said 
above, I do not join in the main opinion's 
treatment of what I regard as the time-
honored and, in some instances, useful doc-
trine of assumption of risk; first, because I 
do not think that treatment is necessary to 
the correct and satisfactory disposition of 
this case; and second, because I think the 
previous decisions of this Court are sound 
and useful applications of the law to the 
particular fact situations and that others 
will likely continue to occur in the future. 
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